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A combination of loose monetary policy and sustained wage deflation underpinned the Conservative’s
economic recovery in the last parliament. These processes have consolidated rather than
overcome weaknesses at the heart of Britain’s growth model, write Scott Lavery and Jeremy
Green. 
When David Cameron emerged from 10 Downing Street on the morning of the 8 th May, he
proclaimed that he would lead a ‘one nation’ government – one whose guiding aim would be to
ensure that ‘the recovery reaches all parts of our country’.
There was nothing particularly new in this rhetorical positioning. Indeed, in the early years of the
coalition government, one of Cameron’s most popular refrains was to state that ‘we are all in this
together’, whilst the Chancellor, George Osborne, emphasised the need to ‘rebalance’ the UK
economy both sectorally and geographically. In reality, over the past five years Cameron has
pursued a distinctive ‘two nations’ governing strategy – one which privileges certain segments of
society whilst imposing discipline and retrenchment on others.
In an article published recently in New Political Economy, we outline some of the distributional implications of this
process and argue that the transition from crisis to ‘recovery’ has in fact been underpinned by a distinctive dynamic
of ‘regressive redistribution’: a process of state-led economic restructuring that has worked through two axes at the
centre of the recovery.
The first axis focuses on Quantitative Easing (QE). The Bank of England opted to begin undertaking QE from March
2009: injecting new money into the financial system by purchasing Treasury bonds from banks and institutional
investors. Crucially, the policy was encoded with distributional prejudices right from its inception: it was targeted at
increasing the wealth of asset holders in order to boost demand.
While wage earners experienced an unprecedented period of decline in real earnings, asset-holders received a
huge wealth boost from the Bank’s monetary policy committee. Stock and bond prices rallied on the back of QE 1
and 2, with the Bank itself calculating that the gains in value amounted to around £600 billion. Picking winners in this
way has been central to establishing a two-track recovery where asset-holders prosper while wage earners suffer.
The second axis of the regressive recovery was premised upon wage deflation. Workers’ real average earnings
declined by 7.9 per cent four years after the onset of the recession, a trend which compares unfavourably against
the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s. While the Conservative party boasted of an ‘employment rich’
recovery, in reality 77 per cent of net job creation between 2010-2013 was focused in ‘low pay’ sectors, where pay
falls below £8 per hour.
On top of this, there has been a regressive re-composition of the British labour market, with growing numbers of
precariously employed individuals finding themselves involuntarily in temporary jobs. Wages might be rising
marginally once again, but this is taking place after a slump in real earnings which has not been seen since the
19th Century. Indeed, wages are not set to rise to their pre-recession levels until at least 2020, suggesting that this
really has been a lost decade for Britain’s low and middle income earners.
This combination of loose monetary policy and sustained wage deflation underpinned the Conservative’s economic
recovery in the last parliament. The problem is that these processes consolidate rather than overcome weaknesses
at the heart of Britain’s growth model. Firstly, they are likely to contribute further to a declining ‘wage share’ – the
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proportion of overall economic output which goes to wage earners. This is potentially destabilising as it can lead to
shortfalls of aggregate demand which in turn encourages high levels of private indebtedness throughout society.
Secondly, the further concentration of wealth at the top end of society – in part sustained by low interest rates but
also ratcheted-up through QE – creates a further glut of income and wealth at the upper end of the income
distribution. This can again create demand problems as wealthy asset-holders have a lower propensity to consume
than low-middle income earners. Long-standing distributional disparities which weaken economic potential and
which entrench social inequities have therefore been consolidated over the past five years.
The Conservative’s programme for the next parliament should be understood in this context. Now with an outright
majority – and unencumbered by the politics of coalition – the Conservatives look set to consolidate the regressive
recovery further. As the IFS have shown, 1.1 million public sector jobs look set to go between 2010/11 and 2019 on
current spending plans. Partly in preparation for this, the Conservatives are already pushing through legislation
which will further curtail trade union power by imposing minimum thresholds on turnout for industrial action. This will
further curtail the capacity of workers to secure wage increases and protect their conditions in the years ahead. In
addition, the £12 billion of welfare cuts will primarily hit the poorest hardest; a process which is likely to further
entrench inequality and increase levels of poverty throughout society.
Continuing to restore growth through these policies will ultimately entrench a more deeply divided and unequal
society than post-war Britain has ever experienced. A recovery built upon these foundations is not only extremely
regressive, it is also hugely unstable. The crisis of the Labour Party has dominated the aftermath of the election, but
it may well prove that a further economic crisis will be the longer-term result of extending Cameron’s regressive
recovery.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the
London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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